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IN HOC SIGNO VINCES: RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM  
IN THE BALKAN WARS 1991-19951 
by Mitja Velikonja 
See now, how men lay blame upon us Gods  
for what is after all nothing but their own folly. 
Homer, The Odyssey, 1st Book (translated by Samuel Butler) 
 
Dr. Mitja Velikonja is assistant professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at 
the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia, specializing in sociology of religion. 
 
I. DISCOURSE OF IRRATIONALIZATION 
 Some of the most common explanations for the Balkan wars of the 1990s have been that 
they were, in the final analysis, religious wars, or the consequence of national incompatibilities 
and cultural differences, or a return of old myths, or a thirst for revenge for historical injustices, 
or the logical result of the bloodthirsty ‘national character’ of the Balkan peoples, etc. 
Deliberately or not, both local and foreign commentators perceived these developments as being 
rationally inexplicable, spontaneous, completely unreasonable, and contrary to any sense of 
rationality. In sharp contrast to, for example, the Gulf war, the Balkan wars were comprehended 
and portrayed as obscure, dirty, mean, uncivilised, cruel, etc. 
 Needless to say, every social action--in our case war--has parallel ‘rational’ and 
‘irrational’ dimensions, which must be studied carefully. Belligerent groups were very often 
from different religious and ideological backgrounds. If we limit ourselves to the secularized 
twentieth century, we find mythic constructs, religious rhetoric and archaic iconography at 
different times and in different parts of the world. Many nations perceived and may still perceive 
themselves to be the Most Ancient, even Holy, Sacred, or Heavenly, as representing Christ 
among the nations, as the Elect, or having a God-given mission to fulfil; others are self-declared 
warrants of democracy or cultured nations. In history we remember military campaigns called 
the Crusades; various dictators were glorified as being sent (or chosen) by God Himself, or as the 
incorporation of the Will of the Nation; politicians have often referred to religious traditions and 
values and swear before God at their inauguration. The struggle of the proletariat against the 
                                                 
 1This paper was presented at the international conference “Nationality and Citizenship in Post-communist 
Europe”, Paris, July 9-10, 2001. 
 
 ruling classes was interpreted in terms of a cosmic struggle between Good and Evil; Holy Wars 
were fought in different parts of the world by different religious fundamentalists; the cleansing 
of their different enemies was imperative for many new states and regimes. The juxtaposition of 
“Eternal Allies” versus “Eternal Enemies” could be found by many warring sides, as could the 
notion of the Last Bastion of the religion or civilization in question. Borders have been perceived 
as sacred, historic, or untouchable; enemies have often been demonized, animalized, or 
bestialized, etc.2  
 It is, of course, not my intention to exonerate any belligerent Southern Slavic 
religious nationalists; I disapprove of them as much as I do of any militants or 
fundamentalists. I wish to emphasize that the battle cry In hoc signo vinces3 has been heard 
across the world throughout the ‘age of the extremes’, to borrow a phrase from Eric 
Hobsbawm. In other words, the catastrophic Hobbesian war of all against all.4 is certainly not 
some kind of Balkan peculiarity, nor is the significance of the role of religion, its rhetoric and its symbols. Therefore, the same questions 
must be asked anytime these phenomena appear anywhere in the world. Other than the hasty and overly simplistic explanations 
mentioned above, I view and treat the use--or misuse--of religious iconography, symbols and discourse, and mythological rhetoric in the 
recent Balkan wars as a very specific version of and regional manifestation of the broader phenomena of the religionization of politics,5 
the nation, place, time, neighbouring groups, and etc. 
 In my opinion, the ‘irrationalization’ of the  Balkan wars in first half of the nineties 
(un)intentionally camouflages the main motives and causes  which, in chronological order, 
are as follows: firstly, the plan to reunite Yugoslavia under the leadership of the non-
reformist segments of the League of Communists and Army hard-liners; secondly, 
prompted by the ineffective policies of the international community, the great-national  
                                                 
 2For an excellent study of the ethnogenetic myths and rhetoric of the Spanish, French, English, Italians, 
Germans and Russians, see Poliakov, 1999; for religious nationalism and religious references in politics in general, 
Hastings, 1997; for Russian, German, Nazi-Fascist, Anglo-American national Messianism in general, and French, 
Austro-Hungarian, Croatian and Serbian Messianism concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Zgodi , 1999; for an 
analysis of the American perception and evaluation of the Vietnam War and the construction of warrior values, see 
Resic, 1999; for the relations and rhetoric of the Roman Catholic Church and extreme Right political parties in 
Europe before and during WW II. (Italy, France, Slovakia, Croatia, etc.), see Wolff, Hoensch, 1987; for  (re)new(ed) 
political mythologies in post-socialist societies, see Tismaneanu, 1998. 
 3According to legend, a cross and the sign By this sign you will conquer appeared to Roman Emperor 
Constantine before the decisive battle at the Milvius bridge near Rome in 312. After the victory, he recognized 
Christianity as one of the official religions and erected a monument with the cross as a symbol of his triumph. 
 4Bellum omnium in omnes. 
 5One of many sociologically significant processes in contemporary societies is the refundamentalization of 
established religious communities and their close alliance with (nationalist) politics. 
 
 policies and aggressions towards Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. All these goals--
reunification and territorial conquests--and the methods in which they were realised, were 
undoubtedly strategically well organized, »rational« and pre-planned.6  
 The obvious attempts to 'irrationalize' recent Balkan history, i.e., to reduce the conflict to a matter of nationalist madness and 
religious zeal, to a spontaneous and somewhat naïve barbarity, a revival of age-old hatreds, etc.--combine two particular dimensions. 
Firstly, the theoretical: this is the discourse of Orientalism7 and the thesis (one of the most popularized in the 1990s) of unavoidable 
cultural conflicts in the contemporary world (in place of the political and ideological conflicts of bygone eras). The second is political: the 
deliberate avoidance of responsibility and feigned ignorance by the main culprits responsible for the war.  
 
II. INSTRUMENTALIZED OR INSTRUMENTALIZING? 
 If we limit ourselves to the religious considerations of the wars, we are faced with a fundamental dilemma. Were religions and 
religious communities and symbols used by nationalist politics/policies in their grand nationalist schemes? Or, conversely, did they exploit 
nationalist euphoria and policies in achieving their own religious goals? Were they ‘instrumentalized’ or did they ‘instrumentalize?’ In short, did 
they play an active or passive role in the most recent Balkan history?  
 I think the answer is that they did both. My answer to these questions may initially seem paradoxical. To certain religious ‘integrists,’ 
political developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s presented an excellent opportunity for the long-awaited re-Christianization and re-
Islamization of the national, political and cultural identity of “their” nations, and the reaffirmation of their dominant position in society.8 The 
already belated modernist differentiation and pluralization of these societies seemed to 
have been lost to radical pre-modernist de-differentiation.9 Religious institutions rapidly became an 
important part of the dominant national/political/religious/cultural meta-platform and strategy.  
 This total--and totalitarian--alliance between nationalist policies and religious communities and institutions was one of mutual 
benefit: national, political and, ultimately, military mobilization could not be achieved without religious legitimation, while, on the other 
hand, religious communities were unable to achieve their goals without the active support of nationalist parties and politics in general. 
Religious elements became an important part of the process of ‘the ethnification of politics and the politicization of ethnicity’ (as 
described by Vrcan, 2001).10
                                                 
 6See for example Špegelj (1994, 2001). 
 7As developed by Said, 1996; for the images of the Balkans, see Todorova, 2001. 
 8For a broader review of the characteristics of religious dynamics in post-Socialist countries, see Smrke, 
1996, 143-189. 
 9This process can righteously be termed “conservative revolution”. 
 10For an excellent cultural-anthropological comparative study of the politicization and militarization of folk 
heritage, oral tradition and epics, legends, mythic motives, heroic characters and the language itself, see ⎩ani , 
1998. 
 
  In other words: in this integristic process of religio-national re-traditionalization11, 
one needed and strengthened the other: religious institutions lent legitimacy to and opened 
perspectives for chauvinist politics, and vice versa. Or, in the words of Radovan Karad〉i , 
not a single important decision was made without the Church (Mojzes, 1998, 89; for a similar 
quotation, see Radi , 1998, 176, 177). Likewise, Bosnian ex-Franciscan Provincial Petar 
Anπelovi  admits that the Church initially supported the major Croatian political party, 
but later reversed its policies and became critical of it (Anπelovi , 2000, 207, 208). The 
major Muslim/Bosnian party was also influenced by PanIslamic traditionalist groupings 
and currents within the Bosnian Islamic religious community (see Bougarel, 1999; L. 
Cohen, 1998, 58; Zulfikarpaši , 1995).12 
 The long Balkan tradition of pluralism dates to the Middle Ages: the Balkans have been a place of meeting, symbiosis, conflict, 
collaboration, syncretism, etc., for several religions (and different sects within them): Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, Bosnian 
Christian, Jewish, Uniate (Greek Catholic), and some others. In clear contrast to their self-declared universal character13, religions in 
the Balkans (as elsewhere!) feigned specific regional, national, local characteristics: they were/are all ‘ethnicized’ or ‘nationalized’ in a 
similar way.14 This becomes particularly obvious in the religio-national mythologies of these 
nations. The Christoslavic religio-national mythology--in our case that of the Serbs and 
Croats--consists of two basic beliefs: that Slavs are Christian by nature and that any 
conversion from Christianity is a betrayal of the Slavic race (Sells 1996, 36, 47, 51). In 
short, Christoslavism represents radical Pan-Serbian Orthodox or Pan-Croatian Catholic 
mythology,15 whose ultimate goal is a national mono-confessional, (and preferably politically), homogenized state. 
 But almost identical mytho-logic can be observed also on the third side. According to the advocates of the Bosnian religio-
                                                 
 11Combined with, on the other side, religio-national exclusivism. 
 12There are opposing views about Alija Izetbegovi ’s maximal ambitions: according to his critic Muhamed 
Filipovi  (2000, 14, 15), he wanted to return Muslims/Bosniaks to Islam (which was one of the mottos in his 
“Islamic Declaration” of 1970, remark by MV) and, after many centuries, to create a Muslim state in Europe. On the 
other hand, D〉emaludin Lati , one of the main Bosnian Islamic ideologues, firmly rejects that Izetbegovi  had such 
plans (Bougarel, 1999, 47). 
 13Except, of course, for Judaism. 
 14“Tribal” elements appeared within Serbian Orthodoxy as well as within Croatian Catholicism. Banac 
describes Bosnian Islam as “folkloric” or “national Islam”, which is in some aspect a substantial negation of 
orthodox Islam (Banac, 1994, 5, 6). 
 15In short, there can be no Serbianism without Orthodox Christianity (quotation in Radi , 1996, 296); or, 
on the Croatian side, religiosity seems to be a matter of genetics: culture and prayer are in our genes, just as faith is 
in our genes (Mojzes, 1998, 92).  
 
 national integrist mythology, all Bosnians are inevitably Muslims.16 One-and-a-half years before the outbreak of 
war, Izetbegovi  characterized the Muslims/Bosnians as a religious nation (L. Cohen, 1998, 
60). Although the role and influence of religious communities and hierarchies before and 
during the last wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were quite different, all the 
warring parties employed religious symbols in their national/political mobilization and 
military efforts. As a rule, dominant religious communities sided with the major political 
parties of »their« nations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the result of such collective politics on a 
largely ‘secularized’ population soon became evident.17 
 Opinions about the nationalist and militaristic role of religious communities in the Balkans from the late 1980s differ 
considerably from scholar to scholar. However, the majority claim that the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church was ‘more harmful’ 
(Mojzes, 1998, 84), than the other two major religious communities. Sells points out that in Bosnia, the Serbian Orthodox Church 
became a servant of religious nationalist militancy (Sells, 1996, 79), and. at the beginning, supported Slobodan Miloševi 's politics 
(Markotich, 1996, 30).18 According to L. Cohen, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was inclined towards 
the largest Croatian political party, which was openly pro-Christian, but also wished to preserve its hard-won autonomy (L. Cohen, 
1998, 63). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were considerable differences in this regard between the stands of Catholic clergy and the 
Franciscans  in Herzegovina and in Bosnia. For Bougarel, the role of the Islamic Community in the nationalist mobilization of the 
Bosnians was particularly blatant (Bougarel, 1996, 96). 
 
III. RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM IN THE BALKAN WARS 
 My paper concentrates only on one aspect of the recent Balkan wars, namely, the use of religious symbolism by the three warring 
sides: Orthodox on the Serbian side, Roman Catholic on the Croatian side, and Islamic on the Bosnian side. These examples must be treated and 
understood in a broader context of the above-mentioned integrist, religio-national mythologies, Christoslavic or Muslim/Bosnian. A comparative 
                                                 
 16For Reis-ul-Ulema Mustafa Ceri , without Islam, Islamic civilization and Islamic culture, we are 
nothing. For him, the Bosniak national identity, language and the army can focus around Islam (Bougarel, 2000, 92, 
93). Some Bosniak authors persistently repeat the historiographical myth that Bosnian Muslims are the descendants 
of the medieval adherents of the Bosnian Church (wrongly named bogomili), who converted to Islam en masse after 
the Ottoman conquest and, for this reason, are the only indigenous nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (in contrast to the 
“latecomers” Serbs and Croats). See, for example, M. Hand〉i , 1940, and A. Hand〉i , 1994 (and to some degree 
also Had〉ijahi , 1990 and Had〉ijahi , Tralji , Šukri , 1991). 
 17Public opinion polls in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1988 showed that only 55.8 % of the Croats, 37.3 % of the 
Muslims/Bosniaks, 18.6 % of the Serbs and 2.3 % of the Yugoslavs declared themselves as believers (Baki , 1994, 
72). The situation completely changed a decade later: 89.5 % of the Croats and 78.3 % of the Bosniaks in the 
Bosnian Federation declared themselves as “religious persons” (Vrcan, 2001, 167); research in Doboj region in 2000 
showed that  88 % of the Croats, 84.8 % of the Bosniaks, 81.6 % of the Serbs and 16.7 % of those nationally 
undefined declared themselves as “very religious” and “medium religious” (Krajina, 2001, 248). 
 18After its break with Miloševi , the Serbian Orthodox Church remained loyal to Greater Serbian politics 
and ambitions and sided with the régimes in Pale and Knin. 
 
 and socio-historical analytical approach can, to some degree, elucidate how traditional religious symbols were renewed and how new religious 
symbols were ‘traditionalized’ during that period; how they were ‘nationalized’ and ‘politicized;’ what elements of religious heritage were most 
often applied; and how these symbols were exploited for military operations and the politics of ethnic/religious cleansing. Due to restrictions on 
space, I shall only present a foundation for further, more profound analyses.19 
 
1. Use of Traditional Religious Symbols. 
 Universal religious symbols (the cross for the Orthodox and Catholic; the Crescent, the colour green, and Qur’anic inscriptions for 
Boshniaks), or religious symbols that had already been ‘nationalized’ (e.g., the Serbian Orthodox symbol /four S’s surrounding a cross/, or the 
combination of the cross and the Croatian coat-of-arms /the so-called chessboard/), were used regularly by the warring 
sides, either individually or as part of broader political or military symbolism. They were 
worn on uniforms, as personal military decor (e.g., badges bearing religious symbols, green 
bands tied around the forehead with(out) Qur’anic inscriptions, rosaries), and on military 
equipment and weapons, flags etc. Uniforms and appearance were sometimes inspired by 
religious or religio-national tradition, e.g., beards and Islamic outfits on the Bosnian side, 
and Chetnik-like attire on the Serbian side. Some Bosnian military units assumed names 
that were inspired by their religion, and in which rigorous religious customs were practised 
(e.g., the Green Berets, El Mujahidin, the Green Legion, Muslim Brigades). Among their 
number were volunteers from various Islamic states.  
 
 
2. Use of Traditional Religious Slogans and Salutations. 
 Some of the most common traditional religious slogans and synthagmas used in military 
and nationalist rhetoric over the last ten years have been God and the Croats; God protects the 
Serbs; A Serb is protected by St. Sava and God; God is most Great,21 etc. Salutations included 
So help you God, Heroes!, the three-finger Serbian Orthodox salute, benediction under the 
sign of the cross, the use of the expressions brothers and sisters, and many more. Army 
chaplains--Christian and Muslim--were to be found in almost every military unit; religious 
                                                 
 19Anyhow, the parallel approach does not mean that I want to equalize the influence and responsibilities of 
the three sides for the warfare, which is clearly very different. 
 20Šahovnica. 
 21 Bog i Hrvati; Bog  uva Srbe; Srbina  uva Sava i Bog; Allahu Akbar (in Arabic). 
 22Pomoz' Bog, junaci! 
 
 practices, customs and symbols were introduced to military life, barracks and units. 
Religious services and rituals, including the blessing of units and weapons, were often 
conducted by local religious dignitaries. Senior clergymen, such as bishops, conducted the 
most important services and rituals. They regularly visited their troops in the liberated 
territories.23 On such occasions, the images of (erstwhile) political leaders and military commanders were displayed alongside icons, 
images of important religious personalities and symbols. 
 The sites of dramatic historical and religious events became the destinations and sites of religio-national pilgrimages and 
rituals (Medjugorje for the Croats, Ajvatovica24 for the Bosnians, the tombs of second-world-war Ustasha victims for the Serbs); 
religious feasts were turned into national holidays (Easter, Assumption, Christmas, St. Vitus’ Day, the Bajram, commemoration of the 
battle of Badr, and the night of the Might) and were celebrated in public buildings. Marching songs and 
political hymns declared religio-national unity and unanimity.26
 On the eve of war, the skeletal remains of fallen and tortured compatriots from 
World War II were exhumed and ritually reburied; the ceremonial procession carrying the 
remains of Prince Lazar through Serbia proper, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1988 
was of a similar nature. A number of high-ranking religious dignitaries, victims of the 
second world war or post-war violence, who were tortured and killed for religious and 
national causes, were canonized. Examples are Orthodox Metropolite Dositelj Vasi  and 
bishops Petar Zimonji , Sava Trljaji  and Platon Jovanovi  in June 1998, and Catholic 
Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac in October of the same year. In some of the more militant 
Croatian Roman Catholic circles, similar homage was conferred on a number of important 
personalities from the wartime Ustasha regime, and on the Serbian side, to Chetnik 
commanders. 
 Contemporary political and military leaders received a flattering religious 
                                                 
 23For example, Patriarch Pavle visited Pale, Knin and the troops besieging Gora〉de. 
 24Known also as Bosnian Mecca, small hajji or hajji for the impoverished (see Lovrenovi , 2000, 55, 56) 
 25Laiat at-kadr, the night when the Qur’an was revealed to Mohammed. 
 26 Here are some examples: The Serbian army are we, All believers in God  (Srpska vojska to smo mi, svi u 
Boga vernici) ( olovi , 1994, 123); or May our unified voice be heard, There is one God for us all, A Croatian 
battle is being waged, Attention, all you criminals  (Nek se ori slo〉an glas, Bog je jedan za sve nas, hrvatski se boje 
boj, zlo incima stoj (Anti , 1996, 36); or The Green Flag is fluttering, long live SDA, Herceg-Bosna is joyful, our 
leader is Alija (Zeleni se barjak vije, nek nam 〉ivi SDA /Stranka demokratske akcije, Party of the Democratic Action, 
the main Bosniak party, led by Izetbegovi , remark by MV), veseli se Herceg-Bosna, voπa nam je Alija ( ani , 
1998, 255). 
 27For examples, see Velikonja, 1998, 328. 
 
 reputation as well: Karad〉i  and Ratko Mladi  were said to be following the thorny path of 
Christ. The first received a decoration from the Greek Orthodox Church, which declared 
him one of the most prominent sons of our Lord Jesus Christ working for peace (Sells, 1996, 
85). Similar courtesies, exaltation and consecration were afforded by high-ranking 
Orthodox dignitaries to another controversial protagonist of the Balkan wars-- eljko 
Ra〉natovi  Arkan. For some Islamic believers, Izetbegovi  became a fighter for Islam, sent 
by God to lead the Muslims along the true path (Zulfikarpaši , 1995, 144, 172), the first 
person after Muhammad to reveal and fulfil the ultimate truth (Miroslav Jan i  in 
Mojzes, 1998, 94). Saudi King Fahd awarded Izetbegovi  with a medal for his contribution 
to the spread of Islam. 
 
3. Interpretation of Political Developments in Religious Terms. 
 As Hastings points out (1997, 18), “the Bible, moreover, presented in Israel itself a 
developed model of what it means to be a nation--a unity of people, language, religion, territory 
and government.” In the Balkans, historical and contemporary developments were 
interpreted in religious terms: analogies were made between contemporaries and episodes 
and personalities from the Scriptures or the religious history of their own nation. In some 
Orthodox circles, for example, the Serbs were referred to as Christ's Nation, the Holy or 
Suffering Nation, the Bearers of the Truth and Divine Justice, the avant-garde of the Slav 
world and Orthodoxy. Serbia was again referred to as Heavenly, etc. Similar constructs 
were also to be found on the Croatian side (Eternal or Holy Croatia; protected by the Virgin 
Mary). The triumphant Croatian military operation “Storm” in August 1995 was seen as 
testimony that this nation (Croatia, remark by MV) is at certain times touched by God 
(Vrcan, 2001, footnote 11 on page 207).31
 In both cases, tragic episodes from the past and present of both nations have been 
                                                 
 28 He described himself as the defender of our tribe and our Church (Mojzes, 1998, 89).  
 29And continues: “Perhaps it was an almost terrifyingly monolithic ideal, productive ever after all sorts of 
dangerous fantasies, but it was there, an all to obvious exemplar for Bible readers of what every other nation too 
might be, a mirror for national self-imagining” (Hastings, 1997, 18). 
 30Even God himself is Serb, according to turbo-folk singer Baja-Mali Knind〉a (the verse Bog je Srbin, ne 
boji se Srbine/Bog je Srb, ne boji se Srb on MC “Pobedi e istina”, 1994) (Duijzings, 1999). 
 31An example of Croatian Catholic exclusivism - Someone said that Europe is ill. That’s right. Europe is ill 
in its wealth. The Croatian nation has preserved its morality and its Christianity. – is quoted by Buden (2000, 59). 
 
 variously interpreted as Golgotha, the Crucifixion, Calvary or the Way of the Cross, their 
land has been declared Sacred, as our Jerusalem or our Palestine, etc. The self-victimizing 
discourse, such as “only our nation/religion suffers,” exculpated political action and 
military operations. In Karad〉i 's words, our deaths, suffering and endurance, we accept as 
God's grace (Powers, 1998, 236). Bosnian Muslims were said to be making sacrifices to 
safeguard Islam by identifying its enemies (Zulfikarpaši , 1995, 172).  
 As a rule, political decisions and military operations received religious 
argumentation and legitimations, and were openly supported by some  religious media 
and in public statements made by religious dignitaries. Thus, they were exalted as actions. 
Examples are, in the name of God, Manifestations of the Faith, Struggle for Christ and 
Europe, Sacred Duty, self-defence, war of liberation, fight for the Holy Cross, etc. Fallen 
soldiers became martyrs34 or Knights of the Faith (and the Nation) who made voluntary 
sacrifices for their religion and nation in the struggle against the infidels. Their tombs and 
monuments were designed as religious objects (in form and with religious inscriptions and 
symbols, etc.). All sides searched for the help of their co-religionists, who suddenly became 
Ancient if not Eternal Allies. There were initiatives to create a so-called Orthodox Circle (an 
association of all countries with an Orthodox majority), or a narrower Balkan Orthodox 
Union.35 The Bosnians ‘discovered’ a long-lasting friendship with Muslim (Arabic) 
countries, while the Croats found the same in Western (Catholic) countries and the 
Vatican. 
 
4. Demonization of the Enemy. 
 In religio-national policies and military operations, the first step towards the destruction 
of the enemy is the process of their symbolic dehumanization. In the racial discourse, they 
become inferior, animal-like creatures. In the religio-national discourse, they are cursed by God. 
This dehumanizaton and demonization of adversaries was engaged in by all three sides. As 
though entrapped in some kind of laboratory of hatred, the enemy was condemned as genocidal, 
diabolical, etc. Myths about religious conspiracies emerged. For Serbian religious nationalists, 
                                                 
 32For examples, see Jokanovi , 1999 (especially the Introduction). 
 33For the role of the Serbian Orthodox media, see Radi , 1998, 84-86. 
 34Mu enici or – on the Bosniak side -  šehidi. 
 35 However, the Serbian Orthodox Church hierarchy did not support these initiatives. 
 
 these were about the Vatican (and German) plot, and the Pope's servants (Italy, Austria and 
Germany); the conspiracy of Western Powers;36 the Green Transversal (Ankara-Tirana-
Sarajevo) and the conspiracies by Islamic fundamentalists (and Ustasha butchers).  
 If we limit ourselves only to insults related to religious identities, the Serbian 
extremists (and the Croatian during Croatian-Bosnian clashes) labelled the Bosnians as 
jihad fighters, mujahidins, janissaries, brothers in fez, whose final ambition was to turn 
Bosnia into a state modelled on the Qur'an, an Islamic fundamentalist state, or a Libyan-
style Jamahiriyah in which non-Muslims would become slaves, etc.37 In the chauvinistic 
media, Izetbegovi  became the world’s foremost soldier of the jihad or the leader of the 
Muslim terrorists. Croat religious nationalists feared Orthodox conspiracies or alleged plans 
to create an Islamic state38 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alarmist discourses also appeared in 
some Bosnian circles, which identified evil-minded plots, the Crusades launched by both 
enemies’ sides and by a Christian Europe. Thus, religio-nationalist extremists from all 
sides justified their policies not only as a defence of their own nation, but also as shields, 
last bastions or fortresses of, respectively, the Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim world.41 An 
obsessive paranoia of being surrounded by enemies of the faith triumphed. As Hobsbawm wrote, “there is no more effective way of 
bonding together the disparate sections of restless peoples than to unite them against outsiders” (Hobsbawm, 1995, 91). 
 If our faith is the only right and righteous42 one, then that of the enemy (or of religious minorities 
                                                 
 36In March 1993, at a funeral for Serbian victims, the local Orthodox bishop stated that not the standards of 
God, but those of the Devil – those are the criteria which today’s world public is applying in its attitude toward the 
Serbs who follow the Orthodox faith (Maleši , 1998, 68). 
 37There were even constructs that Muslims were plotting to put Serbian women in harems (Sells, 1996, 23) 
or that they were planning to turn Fo a into a new Mecca (Malcolm, 1996, 237). For the role of Serbian orientalists 
in invigorating anti-Muslim feelings, see Norris, 1993, 295-297 and Cigar, 2000; for the role of some circles of 
Serbian intelligentsia, see Maleši , 1998, 71. 
 38See examples in Mojzes, 1998, 91; Powers, 1998, 222. 
 39In 1992, a handbill signed by anonymous Muslim Brothers and addressed to the Children of Allah 
explains that our fatherland Bosnia-Herzegovina is attacked and enslaved by pagans. Chetniks slaughter us, while 
Latins (traditional name for Catholics, remark by MV) deceive us, they are taking and abducting our land (D〉aja, 
1994, 34).  
 40Lati  stated that brutal European encirclement would destroy such a state (Islamic, remark by MV) with 
the atomic bomb if necessary (Bougarel, 1999, 47). 
 41Paradoxically, the enemies were, on the other hand, sometimes perceived essentially as compatriots but 
of the enemy faith: according to some mythmakers, Bosniaks were in fact Islamized Serbs or Croats of the Muslim 
faith while some of the Bosnian Croats were allegedly Catholicized Serbs. 
 42According to research conducted in the Bosnian Federation 1999, 53.7 % of the Bosniaks and 41.2 % of 
the Croats think that Islam/Christianity is the sole true religion (Vrcan, 2001, 175). Unfortunately, there are no data 
for the Serbian Republic. 
 
 within their own nations) is scorned as being false, foreign, heretical, superstitious, and even 
sacrilegious. According to this logic of symbolic diatribes, the elimination of other faiths-- 
religious and ethnic cleansing--becomes a religious duty. Killing is no longer considered as 
“homicide,” but as a “malicide,” the liquidation of the evil. Many clerics were killed or 
injured during these clashes and ethnic cleansing campaigns. However, militant religious 
nationalists also demonized political adversaries and critics within a nation. For example, 
after abandoning his Greater Serbian policy, Miloševi  was characterized as the Antichrist 
from Dedinje, his ideology as sombre and his régime as alien to Orthodox tradition and the 
essence of the Serbian nation (whereas those in Knin and Pale were deemed to be 
exemplary). According to PanIslamist Lati , secularized Bosnian intellectuals are more 
dangerous to us than the Chetniks (Bougarel, 2000, 90).  
 Non-integrist ideas, political parties and individuals were also many times 
condemned by religious nationalists on all three sides as atheistic, nihilistic, anti-national, 
foreign, modernist, pro-Western, liberal, left-wing, etc. Similarly, the Socialist régime was 
perceived as being (in) directly responsible for the outbreak of hatred and violence because 
of its desertion of the Bible/Qur’an and because of its immorality and Godless, soulless, 
secularist and anti-Serb/Croat/Muslim orientation. The false and dangerous logic that there 
exists only one type of conflict, namely, between faith and nihilism, and that Extra-
Ecclesiam nulla salus, reappeared.  
 
5. Destruction of the Enemy’s Sacred Objects. 
 In militarist logic, victory is complete when it is accompanied with the symbolic triumph 
over the enemy. The buildings that were most often systematically destroyed throughout the wars 
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina--either in military operations or following conquest--were 
                                                 
 43For example, emigrant priest and self-declared Chetnik vojvoda Mom ilo Djuji ’s promised that he will 
return to Serbia when Vojislav Šešelj and his paramilitary units succeed in cleansing Serbia of the last Jew, 
Albanian, and Croat (P. J. Cohen, 1997, 10); Mirko Jovi , one of the Serbian paramilitary leaders, demanded 
Christian, Orthodox Serbia with no Muslims and no unbelievers (Sells, 1996, 80). According to retired Croatian 
Catholic priest Ante Bakovi , these weeds must be uprooted from the new Croatia (Mihaljevi , 1994). Or, we must 
change people, say in the organization “Active Islamic Youth” (AIO) (Karup, 1998). Sometimes it seems that the 
tragic war was just the first step towards the complete annihilation of pluralism between and within these national 
communities. 
 44As Anπelovi  points out, by driving God out of schools, universities, family homes and, finally, out of 
human souls, Communists made room for Evil (Anπelovi , 2000, 176). 
 
 religious: mosques, churches, chapels, monasteries etc. According to some estimates, 1,000 to 
1,100 mosques were demolished, along with approximately 340 Orthodox and 450 Roman 
Catholic churches and monasteries (Powers, 1998, footnote 68 on page 240; Velikonja, 1998, 
309).45 As has been the case throughout history, the religious symbols of the conquerors were built on the ruins of the sanctuaries of 
the vanquished. Territory must be symbolically appropriated and the sign of victory engraved in stone. For example, Croatian forces 
erected a huge concrete cross in place of a destroyed mosque in Po itelj (Vrcan, 2001, 22). 
 First to raze, first to erect. It is also very symptomatic that sacred buildings were among the first objects to be restored or 
rebuilt after the war. Reconstruction was often sponsored by foreign countries or their religious communities (Greek Orthodox Church, 
Islamic Community, often from Saudi Arabia, Roman Catholic Church etc.). The first synagogue to be built in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 
1945 is expected to be completed in Mostar by the end of 2002; the foundation stone was laid in early May 2001. Such reconstruction is 
practically impossible on territory conquered by the adversary. On May 5 in Trebinje and May 7 (2001) in Banja Luka, Serbian 
extremists held violent protests against the ceremonies dedicating the new foundations for new mosques intended to replace the 
destroyed ones. These events are sad and not uncommon examples.46 These (and other less obvious) examples clearly demonstrate that 
in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina (here I replace Clausewitz), peace is just the continuation of the war ‘with other means.’ 
6. Eloquent Silence 
 In such situations, that which is not uttered is as important as that which is. Silence can be more eloquent than words. Not only 
explicit, but also another indirect symbolic act of religious institutions must be pointed out here: namely, the sinister silence regarding the 
obvious and systematic persecution and liquidation of believers of other faiths, and the destruction of their (religious) infrastructure. In other 
words, significant was not only hate-speech but also hate-silence. Only rarely have moderate representatives of the religious hierarchies reacted 
and condemned the acts committed by their compatriots/co-religionists. What usually happens is that they distance themselves from the blatant 
manipulation of religious justification, rhetoric and symbols, and explicitly reject religious nationalists of their own faith/nation. 
 
IV. UNSUITABILITY OF APRIORISM 
 Religions, their traditional symbols and rhetoric remain important and extremely persuasive elements of contemporary national and 
political mythologies and their iconography. Although latently present at all times, they are particularly exposed during the critical periods in a 
nation's history. As such, they must not be treated as something that is neither a priori tolerant nor militant, nor conciliatory or destructive, nor 
oriented or toward friendship or enmity, or zealot well intentioned. In short, they are neither hateful nor peaceful in advance. Their current 
interpretations and practical activities make them become such. The cross and the crescent are easily transformed into the sword, and the 
                                                 
 45The Franciscan order in Bosnia-Herzegovina alone suffered the destruction of four monasteries, twenty 
presbyteries and twenty-five parish churches and a number of smaller ones (Anπelovi , 2000, 162, 163, 167). 
 46In the summer of 1998, “religious” passion was aroused by a proposal to build a mosque at Zamet near 
Rijeka. According to its opponents, minarets would announce that Europe had been uprooted from this region. 
 
 brilliance of faith, as understood by believers, turn into the glare of the blade. The step from mythomaniac theory to bloodthirsty terror is a small 
one; any creed can be transformed into a ruthless beast. 
 This short introductory presentation illustrates how nationalized, politicized and militarized religious symbolism (and religious 
communities in general) are not merely the consequence of recent catastrophic events in the Balkans, but also one of the sources--not only the 
conclusion but also one of the origins. The hidden hypothesis of this outstanding attention to the religious dimensions and iconography of Balkan 
warfare as promoted by local religious nationalists and some foreign or local simplistic or malevolent interpreters, is that the problems between 
these nations are irrational and cannot be solved in a rational way. In such a narrow-minded or malicious and destructive discourse, the 
differences between Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and other nations--Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims, Jews, other believers and atheists--seem too large 
to be bridged and, as such, becomes the predominant source of the recent hatred and warfare and an instant explanation for it.  
 Such inciting and irrationalizing discourse can be successfully rejected, firstly, by carefully studying the whole complexity of the 
causes of the tragedies, i.e. the parallelism between the well planned, ‘rational’ causes (i.e. Realpolitik) and the ‘irrational,’ mythical and 
symbolic causes. Secondly, it may be rejected through a profound analysis of this particular aspect, namely, the statements, behavior and actions 
of religious institutions, the clergy and, indeed, the believers themselves. And thirdly, it may be rejected by recollecting the rich multinational, 
multireligious and multicultural tradition of the Balkans. Only after doing this may all the involved parties and institutions, including the 
religious, reflect on their attitudes and activities during this period.47
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